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SOME CRITERIA FOR APPLYING INDUSTRYWIDE ENFORCEMENT
MEASURES UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
A. Everette Maclntyre*
The question of where and how industrywide enforcement measures should
be applied under the Robinson-Patman Act' is one of the most difficult issues
currently facing the Federal Trade Commission. It has been argued, and possibly with some logic, that to be completely fair the Commission should proceed
simultaneously against all industry members suspected of violating the price
discrimination act. Obviously, this is not possible in all cases where litigation
is employed simply because of the Commission's restricted budgetary and manpower resources. The Commission must weigh the desirability of proceeding
against all violators simultaneously in the light of its limited resources, taking
into consideration the need for proceeding at least against obvious abuses on
the part of the more prominent members of the industry concerned. The solution of where the balance is to be placed is not an easy one. In fact, this dilemma
brings to mind Mr. Justice Frankfurter's aphorism in another context that
"A confident answer cannot be given; some answer must be given." 2
The Commission has considerable discretion in this area, as the Seventh
Circuit remarked recently:
. . . The Commission need not hold an order against one company in
abeyance until it proceeds similarly against all others. Otherwise, Commission orders would be forever pending and unlawful practices rarely, if
ever, corrected .... 3
The very latitude given the Commission in this connection, however, makes
it mandatory that such discretion be exercised wisely.
The variables facing the Commission in determining whether a situation
is ripe for industrywide enforcement measures include the structure of the
industry, the nature of the alleged unfair trade practice and the enforcement
tools available to the Commission. Before turning to these, however, it might be
helpful to set the mood, so to speak, by referring to the testimony of the Chairman of the FTC before the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations in the spring of this year. A few references to that testimony should
make it clear that the FTC now has the desire to turn to industrywide enforcement measures as opposed to individual case-by-case enforcement through litigation whenever possible. For example, the Chairman, speaking for the Commission, advised that it has now "turned a difficult corner in veering from
pattemless hit-and-miss law enforcement to a guidance role that invites, en* Member, North Carolina Bar, District of Columbia Bar, Virginia Bar; A.B., University
of North Carolina, 1926; LL.B., George Washington University Law School, 1929; Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission. Commissioner Maclntyre is the author of numerous articles
on antitrust law. The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily represent those of the
Federal Trade Commission.
1 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
2 Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 78 (1953).
3 United Biscuit Co. of America v. FTC, 350 F.2d 615, 624 (7th Cir. 1965).
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courages, and backstops efforts of American business to police itself," 4 and that
over a three-year period this agency has attempted to change its emphasis in
enforcement procedures by minimizing reliance on the case-by-case approach.'
Significantly, the enforcement bureaus have been instructed that they are no
longer to report any recommendations on single complaints without further
advising the Commission as to whether the alleged unfair practice is general in
the industry. If the alleged law violation is widespread, then the staff is expected
to recommend some program or plan for dealing with the industrywide problem.'
Before dealing with industrywide discriminatory practices, the Commission
must be in a position to ascertain the extent of the alleged violation of law.
Accordingly, the manner in which Robinson-Patman Act proceedings are initiated
deserves some consideration. Price discriminations are generally not a matter
of public record; rather, they are hidden from view. Under the RobinsonPatman Act, unlike section 7 of the Clayton Act, the staff is generally not in a
position to spot troublesome areas merely from a reading of available publications.
Usually, the first indication of illegal price discriminations comes to the Commission by way of complaint from aggrieved industry members. The result in the
past has been the issuance of a complaint with a view toward putting an end to
the individual violation found. Frequently, the investigation directed toward
an individual respondent or group of respondents developed other cases, and
in that manner many proceedings over a period of time developed industrywide
impact. Of necessity, many of the proceedings were not undertaken concurrently,
giving rise to a cry of unfairness. In view of current policy, the Commission
will emphasize industrywide enforcement proceedings more than in the past.
This dictates that it be furnished with more complete economic data with respect to the pricing practices of those industries under consideration in order
to put administration of the act on a more rational basis. Effective industrywide proceedings under the Robinson-Patman Act require planning. Planning,
which is essentially another label for research, is an obvious prerequisite to the
effective discharge of the regulatory duties of any administrative agency.' In
short, it may be necessary to integrate the activities of the Commission's professional legal and economic staffs further in order to facilitate industrywide proceedings under the Robinson-Patman Act and in other areas. In some proceedings this has already occurred, and I hope to see more of it in the future. I
think the administration of the Robinson-Patman Act deserves no less. While
the structure of an industry will undoubtedly influence competitive behavior,
unfair practices such as discriminatory pricing will inevitably influence both the
structure of an industry and the viability of competition within that industry.
For that reason, if no other, the Commission should actively seek out the areas

4 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 1966 Independent Offices Appropriations of the
Senate Committee on Appropriations, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 323 (1965) (testimony of Paul
Rand Dixon, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission).
5 Id. at 827.
6 Id. at 828.
THE NEED FOR BETTER
7 See FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 162 (1962), citing OPPENHEIm, THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION
POLICY AND INTERCARRIER COMPETITIVE RATES 123-24 (1945).
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where broad-scale rulemaking or adjudicatory proceedings will have the widest
impact.
Before turning to current and recent industrywide proceedings under the
Robinson-Patman Act and possible future developments along these lines, it
may be in order to delineate the investigative, policy making and law enforcement procedures available to the Commission. Industrywide proceedings under
the Robinson-Patman Act and the other statutes entrusted to the Commission
for administration may come under three broad categories, namely, investigation or factfinding, rulemaking, and adjudication. Basic to everything the Commission does, of course, is factfinding. It is the prerequisite for determining
whether the Commission should proceed at all and, if so, whether the problems
posed are best resolved by rulemaking, litigation or informal settlement.
In those instances where a preliminary investigation shows that discriminatory practices are widespread, the Commission, in order to investigate the particular industry effectively on a broad scale without dissipating its investigative
resources, may require the industry members concerned to file special reports
under section 6(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Acte with respect to the
alleged violations of law. Where a broad-scale investigation of an industry
composed of many smaller units is to be conducted, conservation of the Commission's investigative resources almost makes the utilization of the section 6(b)
process mandatory. The special reports lend themselves particularly to the
investigation of alleged Robinson-Patman Act violations. Especially notable
in the exercise of the Commission's powers under this statute have been the
Commission's investigation relating to section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman
Act in the citrus fruit industry9 and relating to section 2(d) of the statute in
the wearing apparel industry,"0 which involved several hundred respondents.
8

Section 6(b) provides that the FTC shall have the power:
To require, by general or special orders, corporations engaged in commerce,
excepting banks and common carriers subject to the Act to regulate commerce, or any
class of them, or any of them, respectively, to file with the commission in such form
as the commission may prescribe annual or special, or both annual and special, reports
or answers in writing to specific questions, furnishing to the commission such information as it may require as to the organization, business, conduct, practices, management,
and relation to other corporations, partnerships, and individuals of the respective
corporations filing such reports or answers in writing. Such reports and answers shall
be made under oath, or otherwise, as the commission may prescribe, and shall be filed
with the commission within such reasonable period as the commission may prescribe,
unless additional time be granted in any case by the commission.
38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1964).
9 ' In April, 1962, orders to file special reports were sent to approximately 92 fresh fruit
grower-shippers in Florida and some 32 in Arizona and California. Information supplied by the
Department of Agriculture indicated that the 124 order recipients shipped approximately 95%
of the fruit consumed fresh in the nation.
The reports provided enough information for the filing of some 84 grower-shipper complaints. In each case the respondent executed a consent agreement. Their acquiescence apparently was brought about by the fact that illegal brokerage payments had further reduced profit
margins which had declined sharply because of rising labor costs. The growers could not have
agreed among themselves to cease making such payments, because of Sherman Act implications.
The special reports also furnished enough information regarding the receipt of brokerage
payments by buyers to enable the issuance of some 40 buyers' complaints. Most of those matters
were also resolved by consent.
10 The Commission opinion in Abby-Kent Co. recites the following statistics with respect
to the § 6(b) investigation pursued in that industry:
In early 1961, following the receipt of many complaints from small apparel
retailers, small manufacturers and apparel salesmen, the Commission addressed Orders
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These proceedings, which laid the foundation for numerous cease and desist
orders in these industries, are classic examples of the Commission's use of the
power to insure maximum investigative coverage in the case of a particular
industry while insuring that the Commission's investigative manpower would
not become bogged down in that proceeding but remain available for other
projects."
The liberal use of the rulemaking powers of the FTC at first glance seems
to be the ideal vehicle for securing industrywide compliance with the law.
Rulemaking "is the best procedure we have for allowing large numbers of parties to express what they want with respect to law or policy that will affect
them."'
It is undoubtedly the ideal proceeding for dealing with the conflict
between important industry segments over the interpretation of the law.
The Commission's most significant procedures in the rulemaking category
are the trade practice and trade regulation rules." Trade practice rules are
designed to eliminate and prevent unlawful trade practices on a voluntary
industrywide basis'" and were utilized by the Commission as early as 1919."
These rules, generally promulgated at the request of a particular industry, seek
to interpret and inform businessmen of the legal requirements applicable to
certain practices widespread in the industry and to provide a basis for voluntary and simultaneous abandonment of illegal conduct by industry members.
The newest rulemaking procedure at the Commission and possibly the
most promising vehicle for securing industrywide compliance with the law is
the trade regulation rule procedure adopted in 1962. In the case of both the
trade regulation rule and trade practice conference procedures, the Commisto File Special Reports to some 232 of the nation's leading buying offices and chain
department and specialty store complexes. The orders required the buyers to submit,
among other things, the names of apparel suppliers who had granted advertising and
promotional allowances during a given twelve-month period, together with the
amounts and purposes of the payments....
A tabular sheet for each supplier was prepared from the buyer's [sic] Special Reports. They indicated the customers each favored and the amounts paid. In February
1962 the Commission unanimously decided to address Orders to File Special Reports
to the 250 sellers who granted the largest amounts of allowances to the greatest number of buyers. Later that year when it was discovered that certain significant sellers
had been omitted, some 60 additional orders were transmitted.
A majority of the Special Reports filed provided sufficient documentation to give
the Commission reason to believe that violations of Section 2(d) of the amended
Clayton Act existed....
Abby-Kent Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
17310, at 22464 (F.T.C. Aug. 9, 1965).
11 Further examples of the Commission's effort to utilize new methods in order to insure
maximum effect from its limited resources in industrywide proceedings have been factfinding
hearings at which industry members appear before the full Commission, as, for example, in the
gasoline hearings. See text accompanying note 24 infra.
12 1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIv- LAW § 6.13, at 147 (Supp. 1965).
13 Allied to the FTC's rulemaking procedures are its administrative interpretations of the
law, entitled "Guides." Of the guides currently in effect, only one has application to the Robinson-Patman Act, namely, the Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandise Payments, adopted May 19, 1960. 1 TRADE REG. RaP. 1 3980 (F.T.C. May 19, 1960). These
guides, however, do not focus on the specific problems of a particular industry. As a result, they
do not have the same potential for achieving compliance with the law on an industrywide basis,
as do trade practice or trade regulation rules drafted to deal with concrete problems.
14 An example of one of the more exhaustive recent attempts to codify the requirements of
the Robinson-Patman Act for the benefit of an entire industry is the Trade Practice Rules for the
Phonograph Records Industry. 16 C.F.R. § 67 (Supp. 1965).
15 For a discussion of the early development of the trade practice conference procedure, see
BLAISDELL, THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMaIssIoN 92 (1932).
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sion's rules of practice make ample provision for affording the interested parties
an opportunity to be heard prior to promulgation of the rule. 6
The significant difference between the two types of rulemaking procedures, which are both expressions of Commission policy, is simply that the
trade regulation rule is accompanied by findings of fact." Accordingly, in an
adjudicative proceeding for violation of a trade regulation rule, the Commission may rely not only upon the proposition of law or policy contained in the
rule, but also on the underlying factual matters determined in the rulemaking
proceeding.' 8
The use of the rulemaking power in the Robinson-Patman area, however,
requires particular caution on the part of the Commission. Too often in the
past have rules purporting to interpret the act in effect debased the process by
merely paraphrasing the words of the statute. On the other hand, the RobinsonPatman Act, unlike the Federal Trade Commission Act, is a fairly specific
statute. Accordingly, the Commission must exercise considerable care that by
its interpretation of the statute it does not, in effect, amend the act.
The rulemaking approach will not be applicable in all instances of price
discrimination whether or not they are industrywide. The value of a rule in a
settled area of the law is debatable. In addition, the issues to which a rule
addresses itself should be fairly narrow and capable of specific definition in the
context of the industry to which it is addressed. As Professor Davis has noted,
the attempt "to clarify a whole area through a rule or policy statement would
often be foolhardy."' 9 In short, a rule purporting to deal with every conceivable
problem under the act might raise as many problems as it seeks to dispel. Accordingly, while the rulemaking process has a great deal to recommend it when
the Commission is faced with widespread practices violative of the price discrimination act, it is a procedure which must be used with discretion.
One approach to industrywide law enforcement through litigation may
be characterized by the attempt to prosecute industry leaders - or at least the
most flagrant practitioners of price discrimination - and to secure industrywide
compliance as a result of the example made. On the other hand, the Commission
may proceed against all or at least a majority of the industry members involved
in the alleged violation of law. The Commission has utilized both approaches,
and both alternatives have their disadvantages. In the first case, the Commission may be criticized for singling out certain industry members, leaving
them at a disadvantage vis-4-vis their competitors. In the second case it has
sometimes been argued that the Commission is harassing business as well as

16 FTC Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 1.67 (Supp. 1965).
17 The difference between trade regulation rules and trade practice conference procedures is
a difference in degree. "As a practical matter, then, trade practice rules are not merely voluntary
and advisory; they are, in many instances, enforceable and enforced." Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, Accompanying Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8370

(1964).
18 The Commission is not obliged to prove disputed issues of fact anew in an adjudicative
proceeding against those industry members allegedly violating the ruleif findings on such facts
had-been previously made in the proceeding promulgating the rule. Id. at 8371.
19 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 12, § 6.13, at 145.
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forcing a price uniformity which is at variance with the general purpose of the
antitrust laws.
As in certain other periods of its development, the Commission's enforcement pattern is at present in a transitional stage. Therefore, no hard and fast
rules can be laid down as to the industries or types of law violations which will
be dealt with in an industrywide fashion or as to the investigational or law
enforcement measures which will be applied in a particular instance. However,
a cursory examination of three recent proceedings of industrywide impact,
namely, the Trade Practice Conference Rules for the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable
Industry, the gasoline marketing inquiry and the so-called wearing apparel cases,
may foreshadow future trends in Commission application of law enforcement
techniques on an industrywide basis in the price discrimination area. My discussion here, of course, is not an exhaustive citation of all current industrywide
proceedings relating to discriminatory pricing.
The Trade Practice Rules for the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Industry, promulgated April 15, 1965,20 are noteworthy recent examples of the Commission's exercise of its rulemaking power in the area of price discrimination. This
rulemaking proceeding had its genesis in the investigation and subsequent adjudicatory proceedings brought in the citrus fruits industry. These, of course,
resulted in numerous cease and desist orders against growers and buyers, involving more than one hundred complaints and orders. 1 As a result, those
industry members not under order and the related fresh fruit and vegetable
industry desired guidance.
Another factor compelling the citrus and fresh fruit and vegetable industries to request a trade practice conference were certain Commission decisions,
namely, Flotil2 and Hruby,2 s which to some extent had unsettled previous
judicial construction of the "except for services rendered" proviso in section
2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act. This issue, among others troubling the
industry, posed the question of whether buyers or their agents could be compensated for brokerage services performed by the buyer. Other important questions relating to the interpretation of section 2(c) also were involved.
This rulemaking proceeding is noteworthy because it shows the potential
of rulemaking for settling questions in an uncertain area of the law where
important segments of the industry are at odds on the proper interpretation of
24
a statute.
20 30 Fed. Reg. 5331 (1965).
21 E.g., Exchange Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1 (1962); Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1437
(1962); Eidson Produce Co., 60 F.T.C. 1 (1962); Florida Citrus Exch., 53 F.T.C. 493 (1956).
16970 (F.T.C. June 26, 1964).
22 Flotill Prods. Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
23 Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1437 (1962).
24 On the one side of the issue, the proponents of the proposed rules, namely, the United
Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association and the Florida Fresh Citrus Shippers Association, among
others, contended that, on the basis of recent Commission decisions, brokerage should not be forbidden unless no services were rendered by the other party. They argued that if services are
performed by a businessman purchasing the goods, he is entitled to be recompensed and §
2(c) does not apply. On the other side, demonstrating the wide impact which the rules were
thought to have, was, among others, the National Association of Retail Grocers, whose interests
are not limited to fresh fruits and vegetables alone, as well as the National Food Brokers Association. Both contended that permitting brokerage payments for services performed by the buyer
or his agent would give powerful buyers considerable leverage, helping them to receive unearned
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Significantly, the hearing on the proposed rules in October, 1964, was held
before the full Commission. The increasing number of hearings in which the
full Commission hears the views of different industry segments on unfair trade
practices and the law enforcement problems facing them is a salutary development. As a result of such hearings, the Commission as a whole is forced to
acquaint itself with the problems of an industry being regulated in a manner
not possible merely from the reading of a cold record or the report of a single
commissioner or a staff member designated to hold hearings.
In many ways the fresh fruit and vegetable rules present a textbook example
of the Commission's use of its rulemaking power to secure compliance with the
law on the part of an industry constituted of many businessmen. Furthermore,
the central problems dealt with, although of considerable importance, were
narrow and readily defined. In short, the issues presented were of the type
that lend themselves to the rulemaking process.
Conceivably, the most significant current industrywide proceeding connected with Robinson-Patman Act problems is the broad inquiry into gasoline
marketing announced on December 30, 1964. To my regret, in launching this
venture the Commission coupled the inquiry with the dismissal, on administrative grounds, of those adjudicative cases in the gasoline marketing field then
awaiting Commission decision. Findings of fact in those proceedings might well
have given us a head start in the current industrywide proceeding."5 Nevertheless, the current inquiry is an important proceeding and I hope that its outcome will benefit both the industry and the consumers it serves.
The broad inquiry into gasoline marketing and the adjudicative cases
preceding it had their genesis in the price wars recurring throughout the nation.
This situation impelled the Mid-Continent Independent Refiners Association
(MIRA) to petition the Commission for a trade regulation rule under the
Robinson-Patman and Federal Trade Commission Acts, apparently with the
primary purpose of preventing major gasoline companies from using the financial advantage derived from their integrated activities and geographic diversity
for the purpose of subsidizing price discriminations and sales below cost to their
independent competitors' alleged disadvantage. In effect, MIRA has asked
the Commission, under the Robinson-Patman Act, to embody in the rule a
presumption that brand names would not affect the determination of like grade
and quality in the case of gasoline. Furthermore, MIRA has requested that
the Commission promulgate a rule that it should be prima facie evidence of
injury when a territorial price discrimination results in a reduction of customary
retail price differentials between the seller's gasoline and those gasolines normally
selling at a lower price.G
The MIRA proposals, on the surface at least, lend themselves to an
price advantages and would in fact have the potential of jeopardizing the whole price discrimination act. In addition, a considerable number of individuals and representatives of associations
in the food industry also argued on this issue pro and con.
25 See Pure Oil Co. 3 TRADE REG. RE'. g 17175, at 22250 (F.T.C. Dec. 28, 1964) (MacIntyre, Comm'r, dissenting).
26 Under the Federal Trade Commission Act MIRA has requested a rule prohibiting sales
below cost where the effect may be to lessen or injure competition and setting standards for computing the cost of gasoline.
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industrywide rulemaking proceeding. The issues presented by the proposed rule
are defined in terms of the oil or gasoline industry. In addition, the proposed
rule deals with sufficiently narrow issues so that if enacted it would be a meaningful guide and not an amorphous paraphrase of the generalized language of
the statute, which itself would later require construction. This is not to say
that an evaluation of all the facts brought to light during this hearing will
necessarily support the promulgation of MIRA's proposed rules.
The suggested rules at the hearing before the Commission were the subject of spirited debate on the part of industry members participating in the
hearings held in May. The clash of views visibly illustrated the varied structure
of the industry and the complexities of the problems involved in regulatory
efforts to resolve the problems of gasoline price wars." In short, the proceeding
evidences the Commission's concern to utilize the industrywide proceeding as
a vehicle to deal equitably with the problems of industry members, ranging
from the largest corporations in the nation to the service station operator in
your own neighborhood. It shows a willingness to engage in industrywide proceedings on a very ambitious scale.
As in other industrywide proceedings dealing with the price discrimination problem, the Commission is again faced with the issue of whether an industrywide regulatory effort might have the opposite result of that intended. Certainly, one of the crucial arguments in opposition to the rules proposed by
MIRA seems to be the objection raised in almost all broad-scale proceedings
dealing with the Robinson-Patman Act - that they would have the tendency
to stifle competition and, in effect, foster a price uniformity at variance with
the other antitrust laws. One memorandum in opposition even suggested that
mere participation in a trade regulation rule proceeding, looking toward these
rules, might violate the Sherman Act.2"
In view of the complexity of the problem posed, the Commission will
have to mobilize the best of its resources. In this connection, the broad marketing inquiry is significant for having integrated the efforts of the economic and
legal staffs in a proceeding involving enforcement of the price discrimination
act to an extent unprecedented in recent years.
Finally, it should be noted that the Commission, in initiating this proceeding, bound itself only to conduct the hearings. It did not undertake to issue
rules but left the result of the proceeding flexible. As a result, other alternatives
are: no action, or the issuance of a factfinding report by either the staff or the
Commission. In the latter eventuality, the Commission, in addition to its investigative function, may have engaged at least in a form of embryonic rulemaking.
My final example of a current industrywide proceeding has been cast in
27 For the purpose of discussion here, the gasoline marketing industry may be classified into
three categories: (1) the twenty major oil companies which are fully integrated, engaged in production of crude oil and refining and own and/or operate wholesale and retail distribution facilities; (2) the 140 smaller integrated, partially integrated and nonintegrated independent refining
companies; and '(3) 5000 companies and firms engaged in distribution at the wholesale level.
Petition for Trade Regulation Rules for Gasoline Marketing, National Congress of Petroleum
Retailers, Inc., p. 4. Representatives of service station operators, whose number is legion, also
testified.
28 Cited in Amended Petition for Trade Regulation Rules for the Marketing of Gasoline,
Mid-Continent Independent Refiners Association, filed July 16, 1965, p. 4, n.1.
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a more traditional mold- the so-called wearing apparel cases. 9 In the period
from May, 1963, to August, 1965, the Commission accepted a total of 298 consent orders from wearing apparel manufacturers prohibiting violation of section
2(d) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. Aside from
the number of wearing apparel manufacturers put under order, the case is
notable since it was the first Commission decision or public pronouncement
delineating the criteria for choosing between the various adjudicatory and rulemaking procedures available for dealing with discriminatory practices on an
industrywide basis. The rulemaking approach was rejected in this instance
since various trade practice conference rules issued for the industry had failed
to reduce the payment of discriminatory advertising allowances significantly.
A trade regulation rule was not promulgated since that procedure has been
impractical when the discriminations involved were sporadic and secretive.
Selective litigation against certain suppliers and the Commission's guides had
also failed to visibly improve the situation. In short, there was no practical
alternative to seeking enforceable cease and desist orders running against all
significant industry members engaged in the alleged violations of law.
In summary, the advisory and rulemaking approach is obviously the ideal
medium for dealing with Robinson-Patman Act problems on an expeditious
and equitable industrywide basis if the conditions are right. But if it wishes to
enforce the law effectively either in individual cases or as to entire industries,
the Commission must resort to the issuance of complaints and cease and desist
orders when the facts indicate that it is the only viable method in that particular situation. From its earliest years and continuing to the present, litigation
on the part of the Commission has been denounced with varying degrees of
emotion as wasteful, a source of harassment to business and even as an instrument of oppression." The Commission should, of course, be alert to possible
abuses. On the other hand, the Commission should not be forgetful of the
statutory scheme which places the cease and desist order at the heart of its
enforcement measures. In certain instances, industrywide problems simply will
not respond to the rulemaking advisory procedures, and litigation, at least as
a last resort, must remain among the law enforcement measures available to the
Commission when the facts dictate this approach.
29 Abby-Kent Co., 3 TRADE REG. R '. 1 17310 (F.T.C. Aug. 9, 1965).
30 For example, Commissioner Humphrey, in one of the more extravagant attacks in this
vein, stated in an address on January 6, 1931, that:
Under the old policy of litigation it became an instrument of oppression and disturbance and injury instead of a help to business. It harassed and annoyed business
instead of assisting it. Business soon regarded the commission with distrust and fear
and suspicion -as an enemy. There was no cooperation between the commission and
business. Business wanted the commission abolished and the commission regarded business as generally dishonest. [Footnote omitted.]
Cited in HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 125 (1936).

